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THE FEDERAL ROLE IN UNIVERSAL PRE-K

Brian McWalters *

I. INTRODUCTION
In his 2013 State of the Union address, President Barack
Obama proposed that the federal government work with states
to make “high quality preschool available to every single child
in America.” 1 In the following days and years, the Obama administration, seeking to garner support for its Preschool for All
proposal, echoed the arguments that have long been made in
favor of preschool. 2 Neuroscience research shows that the human brain at three and four years-old, the age at which children
attend preschool, is in a “sensitive period” and is optimally receptive to intellectual stimulation. 3 Social science likewise suggests there is a unique window of opportunity at preschool age
to positively impact a child’s life. 4 Numerous studies show that

*
Policy Associate, Accountability Counsel; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank Professor Eloise Pasachoff for all her guidance, on this article et al.
And his parents, for everything.
1. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013).
2. See OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: HELPING
ALL WORKING FAMILIES WITH YOUNG CHILDREN AFFORD CHILD CARE (Jan. 21, 2015),
2015 WL 269545, at *1 (pointing to the body of evidence showing the positive impact preschool has on numerous life outcomes); OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE,
PRESS BRIEFING BY PRESS SECRETARY JOSH EARNEST AND SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
KING (Sept. 29, 2016), 2016 WL 5540012, at *3 (noting the high returns of preschool as a societal investment); OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S PLAN FOR EARLY EDUCATION FOR ALL AMERICANS (Feb. 13, 2013),
2013 WL 543888, at *1 (advocating for preschool as a tool for reducing inequality and leveling
the playing field for children from low-income families).
3. Pat Levitt, Building Brain Architecture and Chemistry: A Primer for Policymakers,
in INVESTING IN EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 3, 16 (Alvin R. Tarlov & Michelle Precourt Debbink eds., 2008).
4. See James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 49, 50
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attending preschool can have a positive impact on a wide range
of life outcomes, including increased performance in later
schooling, fewer interactions with the criminal justice system,
and higher earnings as adults. 5
While not impossible to effect these positive outcomes
with educational interventions later in life, preschool presents
an optimal opportunity to make a substantial impact at relatively minimal cost. 6 Indeed, the evident economic benefits of preschool is one of its major selling points. 7 Most cost-benefit
analyses suggest that investment in preschool produces economic gains, resulting from lower special education placement
rates, reduced grade repetition, decreased welfare dependency,
and fewer costs for the criminal justice system, that significantly
outweigh the costs. 8
Education experts rightly caution that preschool is not a
panacea for all societal ills and that it should not be hailed as
such at the expense of other education reforms. 9 However, preschool is worth prioritizing. Whereas the efficacy of many education policies is a matter of contentious socio-scientific debate,
a significant majority of the large body of empirical evidence
assessing preschool points towards its efficacy as a tool for
meaningful impact. 10
Preschool reform is also thought to be less inert than
other education policy areas and, therefore, more responsive to

(2006).
5. Id. at 57.
6. DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 110 (2007); Levitt, supra note 3, at
16.
7. Ryan, supra note 4, at 92.
8. Id. at 66-67 (canvassing research that shows return-on-investment ratios ranging
from two-to-one to over seven-to-one); KIRP, supra note 6, at 82, 160-61 (citing a study estimating a 3 to 1 return on a state’s investment in UPK).
9. Ryan, supra note 4, at 63; KIRP, supra note 6, at 8; ELIZABETH ROSE, THE
PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 226
(2010).
10. Ryan, supra note 4, at 50, 68-69, 88; KIRP, supra note 6, at 78.
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advocacy efforts. 11 Compared to K-12 education, preschool is a
relatively new issue with fewer entrenched special interest
groups to resist reform. 12 The preschool iron may be particularly hot right now; there is broad public support from a wide
range of entities, including teachers unions, business leaders,
economists, and philanthropists, for increasing access to preschool. 13 It is unclear whether any type of early childhood education (ECE) reform is likely to be acted upon by the current
administration; the first budget summary released by President
Donald Trump proposed a significant reduction to the Department of Education’s budget. 14 The administration’s support
for school-choice initiatives, 15 and the First Daughter’s focus on
child care, 16 suggest that a program like the Child Care and
Development Block Grant, which “promote[s] parental choice
to empower working parents to make their own decisions regarding the child care services,” 17 may be the only new early
childhood expenditure palatable to the new administration.
However, the overall trend for preschool reform has been rising bipartisan support. 18 The conventional conservative argu11. Ryan, supra note 4, at 51; BRENDA K. BUSHOUSE, UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL:
POLICY CHANGE, STABILITY, AND THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 109 (2009); ROSE, supra
note 9, at 137-38.
12. BUSHOUSE, supra note 11, at 109.
13. Ryan, supra note 4, at 49-50.
14. Emma Brown & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Seeks to Slash Education Department but Make Big Push for School Choice, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-seeks-to-slash-education-departmentbut-make-big-push-for-school-choice/2017/03/15/63b8b6f8-09a1-11e7-b77c0047d15a24e0_story.html.
15. Id.
16. Sahil Kapur et al., Inside Ivanka Trump’s Campaign for a $500 Billion Child-Care
Plan, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-0223/ivanka-trump-is-pushing-her-500-billion-child-care-plan-on-hill. Child care and preschool
are sometimes treated as analytical distinct, with the former focused on empowering mothers to
pursue economic opportunities and the latter focused on the education of children. The First
Daughter’s conception of child care seems to embody this divide. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9857(b)(2) (2012).
18. DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 160 (2007) (quoting Republican pollster Frank Luntz as saying “Republicans favor these programs at a much higher rate than we
expected.”).
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ment that the government should have no role in ECE has lost
ground to the growing public sentiment that preschool is a wise
societal investment, and many politicians on the right have
modified their stance accordingly. 19 The enactment of new preschool programs as recently as 2015 by a Republican-controlled
Congress 20 suggests that such initiatives could again be politically viable in the near future.
Public support is high, not only for preschool generally,
but specifically for the federal government taking a prominent
role in expanding access to preschool. 21 An issue with national
implications, including the health of the nation’s democratic institutions and economy, a prominent federal role in ECE is
warranted. 22 Furthermore, the federal government, while not
without its own fiscal constraints, can nonetheless use its considerable resources to assist states that have the will but lack the
capacity to expand preschool on their own. 23 Lastly, there is
more historical justification for a strong federal role in ECE.
Though education has long been considered a central responsibility of state and local governments, a common argument
made against federal intervention, 24 ECE is actually one area
where the federal government has traditionally had a leading
role. 25 The federal government created and administered the
19. James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 49, 93 (2006)
(noting that such conservative arguments are particularly unavailing when preschool is voluntary, see infra n.28); BUSHOUSE, supra note 11, at 160; KIRP, supra note 18, at 166-67.
20. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 9212(d)(5), 129 Stat. 1802, 2154
(2015).
21. 2015: Another Momentous Year for Early Childhood Education, FIRST FIVE YEARS
FUND (Dec. 30, 2015), http://ffyf.org/2015-another-momentous-year-for-early-childhoodeducation/ (“An overwhelming majority of the voting public ranked early childhood development as one of the most important federal issues.”).
22. Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform:
How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1543-46 (2011) (discussing the need for a federal role in education generally); See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying
text, noting how these arguments extend logically to preschool.
23. McGovern, supra note 22, at 1546-47.
24. Id. at 1525, 1529.
25. Ryan, supra note 19, at 54.
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national Head Start program, which funds a range of early
childhood developmental programs that serve children from
low-income families, 26 decades before most states took up the
preschool mantle. 27
While the efficacy of preschool may enjoy a general
consensus, there is disagreement among advocates about
whether efforts should be focused on creating targeted preschool programs (TPK), in which education services are made
available specifically for low-income children, or establishing
universal preschool (UPK), 28 in which all children, regardless of
socio-economic status, are afforded the opportunity to attend
free preschool. 29 Indeed, Obama’s proposed initiative embodied
this divide. Notwithstanding its titular objective, Preschool for
All would have only required states to extend publicly-funded
preschool to four-year-olds from families at or below 200% of
the poverty line. 30 However, with additional features incentivizing states to extend access even further, 31 UPK may have been
the ultimate goal.
This paper argues that the federal government should
promote UPK reform and that it can best accomplish this
through a competitive grant program that cognizes the statelevel conditions most conducive to UPK implementation. Part
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9831 et seq. (2012).
27. Ryan, supra note 19, at 54.
28. UPK usually connotes a voluntary program in which parents are given the option,
rather than required, to enroll their children. Aryn M. Dotterer et al., Comparing Universal
and Targeted Prekindergarten Programs, in THE PROMISE OF PRE-K 65, 66 (Robert C. Pianta
& Carollee Howes eds., 2009). This paper uses UPK in this prevailing sense and will not discuss this policy design choice, except to say, briefly, that pursuing a mandatory system of UPK
would, at this time, be politically infeasible. Ryan, supra note 19, at 92-93.
29. Grover J. Whitehurst, Can We Be Hard-Headed About Preschool? A Look at Universal and Targeted Pre-K, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 23, 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/can-we-be-hard-headed-about-preschool-a-look-atuniversal-and-targeted-pre-k/.
30. OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: HELPING
ALL WORKING FAMILIES WITH YOUNG CHILDREN AFFORD CHILD CARE (Jan. 21, 2015),
2015 WL 269545, at *3.
31. Id.
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II will posit that UPK is a worthwhile goal, both because of the
impact it stands to make for all children and because UPK systems may ultimately produce better results for low-income
children than TPK. Part III will show that a competitive grant
program, rather than a cost-sharing initiative or formula grant
program, is the most practical paradigm for effectuating meaningful UPK reform, and that such a program should award
funds to states, rather than more local government entities. Part
IV will examine the state-level process of UPK implementation
in three pioneering states. Part V will then turn back to program design, this time abstracting from the state-level examination the crucial factors to successful UPK implementation and
recommending how a competitive grant program can best leverage these factors.
II. UNIVERSAL VS. TARGETED PRESCHOOL

a. Differing Aims of Universal and Targeted Preschool
Proponents of UPK and TPK often focus on distinct
normative considerations. UPK advocates note that many of
the reasons for why Americans value universal access to a free
K-12 education apply with equal force to preschool. 32 Education is often exalted for its role in molding conscientious citizens and participants in our democratic system. 33 Education reformers have, since this country’s infancy, emphasized its role
in cultivating an informed and capable citizenry, and this function is responsible, in part, for the adoption of a universally-free

32. ELIZABETH ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO
UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 146 (2010).
33. Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for A Right to Education Under the
U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L.
REV. 550, 550–51 (1992); Richard L. Wobbekind, On the Importance of Education, 47 BUS.
ECON. 90, 91 (2012).
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K-12 education system in every state. 34 Given the body of evidence suggesting that early childhood education makes participants more amenable to later schooling, 35 this rationale for universal education extends logically to preschool. 36
Universal education also has important implications for
the national economy, dictating the strength of the national
workforce and portending the economy’s ability to grow. 37
Some economists have concluded that preschool is, in the long
run, significantly more effective at boosting economic productivity than K-12 reform initiatives or even job training programs. 38 This helps explain why the UPK movement has found
some of its most ardent supporters in the business community. 39
Advocates of TPK focus on preschool as a tool for narrowing the achievement gap that exists between children from
low-income backgrounds and those from wealthier households.
Low-income children often enter kindergarten significantly
behind their peers in academic capabilities, and this initial gap
often expands as their schooling progresses. 40 Because a government has limited resources with which to make preschool
freely accessible, TPK advocates argue that those resources
should be focused on those children who would not otherwise
have access. 41

34.
35.
(2006).
36.
37.

Bitensky, supra note 33, at 551.
James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 49, 57

See id. at 51; ROSE, supra note 32, at 146.
Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform:
How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1543-44 (2011).
38. DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 78 (2007).
39. KIRP, supra note 38, at 76; ROSE, supra note 32, at 135; see infra note 164 and accompanying text.
40. Ryan, supra note 35, at 56.
41. Id. at 68; ROSE, supra note 32, at 131; Grover J. Whitehurst, Can We Be HardHeaded About Preschool? A Look at Universal and Targeted Pre-K, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/research/can-we-be-hard-headedabout-preschool-a-look-at-universal-and-targeted-pre-k/.
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Though low-income children would have access to preschool under a UPK system, TPK advocates worry that UPK
spreads finite public resources too thin, diluting the quality of
education received by low-income children for the benefit of
families that ostensibly have other means to provide for their
young children’s education. 42 Furthermore, UPK systems
could, TPK advocates fear, fall into the same funding paradox
that has bedeviled K-12 funding, in which schools serving children from wealthier localities frequently receive more resources
than the schools serving low-income children that are more in
need of resources. 43

b. Overlapping Impact: Equality
The intuitive appeal of preschool as a means to level the
playing field for disadvantaged children bolsters the TPK paradigm’s claim to primacy in the preschool debate. However,
there are reasons to believe that UPK systems can also advance
these interests for low-income children. First, there is reason to
believe that legislators seeking to design equitable UPK systems
will not face the same obstacles that have impeded the progress
of K-12 finance reform. The entrenched and unwieldy bureaucracies that have accumulated over the long history of K-12 education are rare in the realm of ECE, 44 and policymakers have
proven adept at integrating those ECE entities that are preexisting into mixed-delivery systems. Recently, states have indeed been successful in designing systems that provide universal
access while prioritizing the interests of low-income children. 45
42. Natalie Gomez-Velez, Can Universal Pre-K Overcome Extreme Race and Income
Segregation to Reach New York’s Neediest Children? The Importance of Legal Infrastructure
and the Limits of the Law, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319, 340, 351 (2015).
43. Id. at 340.
44. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
45. Gomez-Velez, supra note 42, at 336 (noting that, although budgetary problems have
impeded its implementation, New York State’s UPK law is well-designed to “serve the interests

28

MCWALTERS_MACROS.DOCM (DO NOT DELETE)

1]

4/10/2019 12:12 PM

The Federal Role in Universal Pre-K

More importantly, political realities bring into question
whether TPK programs are actually more effective than UPK
in ensuring the quality of the preschool for low-income children. TPK programs are often marginalized in public discourse
as welfare programs and subjected to proposed budget cuts, especially in fiscally conservative states. 46 TPK programs that
struggle to maintain funding must choose between making cuts
that hurt quality 47 or further limiting eligibility to only the most
impoverished children. 48 Many TPK programs are, as a result
of dwindling funding, unable to serve all of the low-income
children in their ambit, 49 a shortcoming made all the more glaring by the fact that many families not considered low-income
nonetheless struggle with ECE costs. 50
UPK tends to garner wide public support, making it less
likely to end up on a legislature’s proverbial chopping block. 51
In Georgia and Oklahoma, two model UPK states discussed below, commentators suggest that the universality of their preschool programs has lifted them above the partisan fray and ensured their longevity. 52 For two decades now, these states have

in reaching vulnerable children, ensuring high quality programs, and addressing issues necessary to close achievement gaps.”).
46. BRENDA K. BUSHOUSE, UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL: POLICY CHANGE, STABILITY,
AND THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 60-61 (2009); KIRP, supra note 6, at 89.
47. DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 39, 45, 67 (2007) (noting that while
quality, not money, is the end sought, funding a vital means to that end).
48. See Sara Dorn, Ohio Preschool Funding Policy Cuts Millions from Schools Serving
Poorest Kids, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/metro
/index.ssf/2016/08/ohio_preschool_funding_ policy.html.
49. ELIZABETH ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO
UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 132 (2010).
50. Wilson Greene, Universal Preschool: A Costly but Worthy Goal, 35 J.L. & EDUC.
555, 555 (2006); ROSE, supra note 49, at 109, 113, 136; see Ethan Wolff-Mann, Is Your State
One of 23 Where Pre-K Costs More Than College?, TIME, April 11, 2016,
http://time.com/money/4289032/pre-k-costs-more-than-college-in-23-states/.
51. Gomez-Velez, supra note 42, at 351; Fawn Johnson, How Georgia Got Republicans
and Democrats to Embrace Universal Pre-K, THE ATLANTIC, May 7, 2014,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/how-georgia-got-republicans-anddemocrats-to-embrace-universal-pre-k/430899/.
52. See infra notes 117-118, 149-150 and accompanying text.
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been able to offer access to high quality preschool to all families
struggling with ECE costs, as well as to children from wealthier
families. 53
In addition to its ability to secure stable funding, UPK
systems also tend to have other unique characteristics that are
conducive to producing high quality programs for low-income
children. UPK systems are more likely than TPK to produce
preschool classrooms that are socio-economically diverse, 54 a
condition that studies suggest can significantly enhance outcomes for low-income children. 55 It is possible for TPK programs to utilize design mechanisms, such as subsidized spots for
low-income children in private preschools, to produce diversity,
and UPK systems will not always produce diversity in localities
fraught with socio-economic isolation. 56 However, empirical
evidence from the current ECE landscape suggests that socioeconomic diversity is more easily accomplished through UPK. 57
UPK programs can also be more easily incorporated into existing public elementary school infrastructures, providing
access to valuable commodities such as facilities and professional development resources. 58 Assimilation with public elementary
schools also fosters the proper alignment of curricula and learning goals, helping to ensure that the academic gains produced
by preschool are built upon. 59 Though TPK programs can also

53. See infra notes 124-125, 156-157 and accompanying text.
54. Aryn M. Dotterer et al., Comparing Universal and Targeted Prekindergarten Programs, in THE PROMISE OF PRE-K 65, 67 (Robert C. Pianta & Carollee Howes eds., 2009).
55. DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 89-90 (2007); ROSE, supra note 49,
at 148; CLIO CHANG, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, WHY INTEGRATED PRESCHOOLS HELP
EVERY STUDENT (2015).
56. Aryn M. Dotterer et al., Comparing Universal and Targeted Prekindergarten Programs, in THE PROMISE OF PRE-K 69, 74 (Robert C. Pianta & Carollee Howes eds., 2009);
KIRP, supra note 49, at 89-90.
57. Aryn M. Dotterer et al., Comparing Universal and Targeted Prekindergarten Programs, in THE PROMISE OF PRE-K 70 (Robert C. Pianta & Carollee Howes eds., 2009); KIRP,
supra note 49, at 89-90.
58. ROSE, supra note 49, at 175, 177.
59. Id. at 177; Kristie Kauerz, Learning from Others: State Efforts to Expand Services
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be designed to mesh with a public elementary school system,
UPK presents a unique opportunity to do so uniformly and
avoid the variability that results from a patchwork of separate
ECE programs. 60
Implementing a UPK system can even have a reciprocal
positive effect on public elementary schools. 61 In some states,
pursuit of UPK has put a renewed focus on ensuring quality
kindergarten, a development that could further boost the quality of education received by public school children. 62 Some advocates go so far as to theorize that creating UPK could be the
first step in recalibrating early elementary school education to
be more age-appropriate in light of our evolving understanding
of adolescent development, though this dynamic has yet to materialize in practice. 63
Studies comparing the quality of current universal and
targeted preschool programs suggest neither paradigm has a
clear advantage in terms of producing a quality experience for
low-income children. 64 UPK programs tend to have longer
class days and more experienced teachers while TPK programs
tend to produce smaller child-teacher ratios and score better on
observational assessments of quality. 65 Measures of academic

and Build Systems of Early Care and Education, in INVESTING IN EARLY CHILDHOOD
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 85, 102.
60. See ELIZABETH ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO
UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 96 (2010).
61. Id. at 227-28.
62. Natalie Gomez-Velez, Can Universal Pre-K Overcome Extreme Race and Income

Segregation to Reach New York’s Neediest Children? The Importance of Legal Infrastructure
and the Limits of the Law, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319, 334 (2015); Kauerz, supra note 59, at

102-03.
63. ROSE, supra note 60, at 227.
64. Aryn M. Dotterer et al., Comparing Universal and Targeted Prekindergarten Programs, in THE PROMISE OF PRE-K 65, 71-74 (Robert C. Pianta & Carollee Howes eds., 2009).
Other studies have found the public schools generally provided higher quality preschool than
do private providers, ROSE, supra note 9, at 177, which suggests UPK should be prioritized
over some TPK programs, like CCDB, that provide vouchers to low-income families to be
spent on private ECE providers.
65. Dotterer et al., supra note 64, at 71-72.
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gains are likewise unable to definitively resolve the debate, with
some metrics suggesting a narrow advantage for UPK and others a narrow advantage for TPK. 66 These conclusions should,
however, ease fears that pursuing UPK implementation will
significantly dilute the quality of preschool available to lowincome children. UPK’s ability to serve national interests 67 and
ensure access for moderate-income children 68 should therefore
dictate its primacy as a matter of federal policy.
III.MACRO-DESIGN CHOICES: CHOOSING THE MODEL
FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION

a. Choosing a Federal Intervention Paradigm
Obama’s Preschool for All (PSA) proposal contemplated
a federal-state partnership in which the federal government and
each of the 50 states shared the costs of implementing and operating state-wide preschool. 69 The federal government would
assume a significant share of the costs at first, with states gradually assuming more of the costs over time. 70 The appeal of such
a proposal is the sweeping impact it promises: almost instantaneous access to preschool for every preschool-aged child in the
nation, regardless of the state in which he or she resides. However, had the Obama administration fleshed out the details of
its fledgling initiative, it would have uncovered some formidable legal and political obstacles to such a federal endeavor.

66. Id. at 72-73.
67. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
69. OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET PRESIDENT
OBAMA’S PLAN FOR EARLY EDUCATION FOR ALL AMERICANS (Feb. 13, 2013), 2013 WL
543888, at *1.
70. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET SUMMARY
AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 13 (2015) [hereinafter BUDGET SUMMARY].
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The federal government’s legal ability, never mind its
political ability, to mandate the implementation of UPK in every state is dubious. 71 It is unclear whether Congress’s Commerce Clause power, which the Supreme Court has narrowed
in recent decades, would enable it to mandate such an education policy. 72 Even with a constitutional basis for such a policy,
the federal government would, in order to avoid violating the
anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment,
seemingly have to implement and operate a UPK system without requiring any assistance from state or local governments, 73 a
costly expansion of the federal bureaucracy that is presumably a
political nonstarter.
Any federal UPK policy would therefore likely have to
be accomplished using Congress’s Spending Clause powers, the
means through which almost all of the federal government’s
education policy has been enacted. 74 Implementing UPK in all
50 states is seemingly possible through use of a formula grant
program, in which every state is offered a sum of funding determined algorithmically using criteria such as population. 75
This is the paradigm utilized by Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA), which has provided substantial educational funds to every state for decades. 76

71. James E. Ryan, The Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal
Boundaries of Education Governance, in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE? THE TANGLED WEB OF

SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 42, 47 (Noel Epstein ed., 2004).
72. Id. (noting that in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), “the Court emphasized that education was an area in which states ‘historically have been sovereign’ and suggested
that public schools might simply be beyond the scope of Congress’s regulatory authority.”).
73. See id. (discussing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
74. See Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example
of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 581 (2013).
75. Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Education Federalism: President Obama’s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522, 531-32
(2011).
76. 20 U.S.C. § 6332 (2012).
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However, formula grants under the Spending Clause
power are also subject to legal constraints. A new UPK grant
program cannot attempt to coerce involvement of every state
by, for instance, conditioning future ESEA funds on participation in the UPK program. 77 A new formula grant program also
likely entails an expensive, long-term federal investment. In his
proposed budget, Obama requested from Congress $75 billion
over 10 years to fund PSA. 78 Though support in general is high
for a federal role in preschool reform, 79 the political feasibility
of a new ECE expenditure as large as Head Start, which is the
frequent target of proposed budget cuts by prominent fiscal
conservatives, 80 is questionable.
Formula grants are also of limited utility where the goal
is to implement specific reforms. 81 Though the federal government can attach conditions to an offer of a formula grant, requiring states that accept to comply with certain policy directives, these conditions tend to be general, leaving states ample
leeway to use funds in ways that diverge from the federal government’s priorities. 82 Though the federal government could
theoretically attach more stringent conditions, flexibility for
formula grantees seems especially important given the current

77. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–04 (2012). But see
Pasachoff, supra note 74, at 617, which argues that ESEA reauthorizations are distinguishable
from the legislation at issue in NFIB and thereby suggests a possibly permissible means to coax
states into implementing a new policy initiative.
78. BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 70, at 13.
79. See 2015: Another Momentous Year for Early Childhood Education, FIRST FIVE
YEARS FUND (Dec. 30, 2015), http://ffyf.org/2015-another-momentous-year-for-earlychildhood-education/.
80. See Robert Costa, House GOP Poverty Report Focuses on Reforming Welfare,
Overhauling Social Programs, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/house-gop-budget-will-focus-on-reforming-welfare-overhauling-socialprograms/2014/03/02/26b17b78-a23e-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html.
81. Benjamin Michael Superfine, Stimulating School Reform: The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act and the Shifting Federal Role in Education, 76 Mo. L. Rev. 81, 107
(2011).
82. ROBERT JAY DILGER & EUGENE BOYD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
BLOCK GRANTS: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES 2, 9-10 (2014).
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political climate. In recent years, there has been unprecedented
instances of states turning down significant formula funds because of the conditions attached. 83 With flexibility something of
a political prerequisite, a UPK formula grant program might
actually result in little UPK reform. If, for instance, political realities necessitate minimal matching and maintenance of effort
requirements, a grantee could use formula funds to merely supplant pre-existing ECE funds and use these newly freed-up
funds for any number of purposes with little relation to UPK. 84
An alternative to formula grants is competitive grant
programs, in which grantees are chosen among a pool of applicants on the basis of some federal-determined set of criteria.
Competitive grant programs are typically limited in duration
and, consequently, tend to focus on increasing the capacity of
grantees so that they can continue progressing toward policy
goals after the program ends. 85 That competitive grant programs do not usually entail a perpetual and expensive federal
role might explain why Congress has frequently utilized this
paradigm for education programs in recent years. 86
By inviting participation, rather than attempting to coax
it from every state, competitive grant programs are more faith-

83. The most infamous example of this is the Medicaid expansion saga, in which nearly
20 states declined an influx of funding that would have amounted to billions of dollars. This
episode may be of limited use as an analogy, given particularly contentious climate surrounding
the Affordable Care Act and certain design features like the eventual 10% state match requirement. However, similar threats to refuse substantial federal funds were made about the education funds included in the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, see Superfine, supra note 81, at 107, further suggesting a new willingness
among states to reject new formula funding.
84. See KENNETH FINEGOLD ET AL., THE URBAN INST., BLOCK GRANTS: DETAILS
OF THE BUSH PROPOSALS 7 (2004).
85. The Preschool Development Grant program, discussed infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text, requires states to describe plan to sustain grant-related activities after the
program ends. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 9212(d)(5), 129 Stat. 1802,
2154 (2015).
86. See Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Education Federalism:
President Obama’s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522, 523
(2011).
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ful to the spirit of cooperative federalism. 87 The competitive
grant paradigm is not completely without detractors who claim
they infringe on state autonomy. 88 However, the assertion that
states can be compelled into applying to new competitive grant
programs has thus far been unavailing, both politically and in
court. 89 The political feasibility of the competitive grant model
as a means to promote UPK is best evidenced by the recent
creation of the Preschool Development Grants program, which
was approved as part of the bipartisan Every Student Succeeds
Act by a Republican-controlled Congress, 90 and has been described as a precursor to Obama’s proposed Preschool for All. 91
Theoretically, competitive grants have the most limited
potential to make a broad impact. Some jurisdictions will
choose not to participate in the program, and even many jurisdictions that do apply will not be awarded funds. 92 However, a
competitive grant program can have a profound impact for
those grantees truly acting as willing partners. 93 By awarding
87. Omari Scott Simmons, Lost in Transition: The Implications of Social Capital for
Higher Education Access, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 235-36 (2011).
88. Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform:
How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1536-41 (2011).
89. See Jindal v. United States Dep’t of Educ., No. CV 14-534-SDD-RLB, 2015 WL

5474290, at *11 (M.D. La. Sept. 16, 2015) (summarizing one state’s arguments against the Race
to the Top program before dispensing with them and finding the program a valid exercise of
the Spending Clause power).
90. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
91. OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: THE
PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET, 2016 WL 491300, at *5; OFF. OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: OBAMA ADMINISTRATION RECORD FOR
WOMEN AND GIRLS (2014), 2014 WL 4198372, at *3. The Preschool Development Grants
awarded funds from a substantially smaller pool of $250 million to states to be used to bolster
the state’s education administration capacities. Funds were to be used for conducting assessments of the state’s current ECE system, developing plans for coordinating existing programs,
disseminating information to parents, and sharing best practices among ECE providers within
the state. Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 9212(f), 129 Stat. at 2155-56.
92. How design choices of a competitive grant program might affect both how many
states apply and what portion of applicant states are awarded funds is a worthwhile subject that
is, regrettably, beyond the scope of this paper.
93. In defending the Race to the Top program, the Obama administration frequently
noted that, while the number of states impacted was limited, the program promoted systemic
reform in those states awarded funds. OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE,
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funds to those jurisdictions where conditions are most favorable
to achieving a specific policy goal, competitive grant programs
concentrate funding where it is most likely to have type of
meaningful impact sought. 94 Formula grant programs, by contrast, can be accused of “throw[ing] good money after bad” in a
quixotic attempt to foster reform in states with very different
priorities. 95
A competitive grant program can also have a constructive impact on those jurisdictions that are not awarded funds, as
the work done by applicant-jurisdictions to prepare a competitive application can, itself, spur reform. 96 Ultimately, a competitive grant program may even provide a reform impetus to those
jurisdictions that initially refrained from applying, as the implementation of UPK in neighboring jurisdictions increases the
pressure on policymakers in jurisdictions without UPK. 97 If one
competitive grant program is successful in boosting grantee capacity and producing self-sustaining UPK systems in some jurisdictions, subsequent iterations can also be modified to address the conditions that led other jurisdictions to miss out or
refrain from applying. 98

FACT SHEET: THE RACE TO THE TOP (2009), 2009 WL 3637744, at *1.
94. See Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Education Federalism:
President Obama’s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522, 532
(2011). This contention is also a response, though not a solution, to one of the common critiques of competitive grant programs: that they reward with capacity-enhancing funds those
grantees that are able to compete effectively because they already boast high capacity. Id. at
533. While the dilemma is vexing, the answer is not to award funds from a limited pool to
grantees that are operating at too great a capacity-deficit and cannot plausibly be expected to
achieve the impact sought.
95. Joseph P. Viteritti, The Federal Role in School Reform: Obama’s “Race to the
Top”, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2087, 2106 (2012).
96. See id. at 2103; Manna & Ryan, supra note 94, at 530, 532; Ruth Marcus, Civil
Rights Groups Are Picking the Wrong Fight with President Obama, WASH. POST, July 30,
2010, at A21.
97. Manna & Ryan, supra note 94, at 527.
98. The Race to the Top program had subsequent rounds of awards, and many states
were able to capitalize on the work they did in preparation for the first round to secure an
award. Viteritti, supra note 95, at 2103. The Preschool Development Grant program bifurcated
its applicant pool, earmarking a portion of funds for states with “either small or no State Pre-
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The competitive grant model cannot achieve nationwide UPK with one fell swoop. However, many national policy
shifts, including ones in education, 99 have occurred when successful reform in a select few states or cities generated a momentum that snowballed as more jurisdictions followed suit. 100
By targeting funds towards those states most likely to achieve
UPK reform, a competitive grant program could push UPK
towards a tipping point beyond which it becomes a national
priority. Considering the legal and political constraints surrounding other models of federal intervention, the opportunity
to make such an impact is one UPK advocates should not pass
up.

b. Choosing the Applicant Field: States vs. LEAs
Opting to pursue UPK reform using a competitive grant
model that does not purport to produce nation-wide coverage
raises another important design question: whether the program
should solicit applications from and award funds to states or individual school districts, also known as local education agencies
(LEAs). Recent history demonstrates that both states and LEAs
can be effective drivers of UPK reform. Since the 1980s many
states have taken the lead in expanding access to preschool, 101
and several states have succeeded in implementing renowned

school Programs.” Applications for New Awards; Preschool Development Grants – Development Grants, 79 Fed. Reg. 48854, 48854 (Aug. 18, 2014).
99. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OVERVIEW AND
INVENTORY OF STATE EDUCATION REFORMS: 1990 TO 2000 2-3 (2003) (summarizing several
educational reforms that saw widespread adoption amongst the states).
100. Alex Tribou & Keith Collins, This is How Fast America Changes Its Mind,
BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-pace-of-socialchange/.
101. DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 219 (2007); Anne W. Mitchell, Models for Financing State-Supported Prekindergarten Programs, THE PROMISE OF PRE-K, supra
note 28, 51, 52.
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UPK systems. 102 In more recent decades, LEAs in several big
cities, some of which serve a population exceeding those of entire states, have successfully implemented comprehensive UPK
systems, even as their states drag their legislative feet. 103
The federal government could conceivably provide both
states and LEAs pursuing UPK reform the opportunity to avail
themselves of federal funds through complementary programs.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, for instance,
included two competitive grant programs focused on education. 104 The Race to the Top program awarded funds to states
to pursue statewide reform, 105 while the Investing in Innovation
program provided an opportunity for ambitious LEAs to secure
funds without having to rely on their state’s ability to secure a
grant. 106 Another possibility is designing a grant program to
produce a hybrid applicant pool that includes both states and
LEAs of certain sizes. However, opting for a hybrid approach
has some potentially serious drawbacks, including the possibility of political strife resulting from the delineation of noneligible LEAs 107 and friction among LEAs and states over differing application priorities. 108
102. See infra Part IV.
103. Lillian Mongeau, What Boston’s Preschools Get Right, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 2,
2016,
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/08/what-bostons-preschools-getright/493952/; Kate Taylor, New York City Will Offer Free Preschool for All 3-Year-Olds,
N.Y. TIMES, April 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/nyregion/de-blasio-pre-kexpansion.html.
104. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009).
105. See id. §§ 14005(c), 14006.
106. See id. § 14007.
107. Eloise Pasachoff, Block Grants, Early Childhood Education, and the Reauthorization of Head Start: From Positional Conflict to Interest-Based Agreement, 111 PENN ST. L.
REV. 349, 355-56 (2006) (chronicling the demise of the Comprehensive Child Development
Act of 1971).
108. The situation is somewhat analogous to the decision of several California LEAs to
apply for a No Child Left Behind waiver when the state refused to comply with some of the
requirements necessary to receive a waiver. See Michele McNeil & Lesli A. Maxwell, Critics
Blast Away at California Districts’ Waiver, EDUC. WEEK, Aug. 16, 2013,
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2013/08/16/01corewaiver.h33.html.
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If we assume that complementary or hybrid programs
are not politically viable, choosing one applicant pool over the
other entails tradeoffs that need to be examined. Grants to
states neglect those LEAs within states that do not prioritize
UPK reform. LEAs seeking to implement district-wide UPK
will be precluded from receiving grant funds by a state that
submits a weak application or declines to apply at all. Grants to
LEAs, on the other hand, put smaller LEAs, which tend to be
located outside of major metropolitan areas, at a disadvantage. 109 These smaller LEAs, which would benefit from implementation of statewide UPK, are unlikely to have the capacity to compete effectively with larger LEAs. Though the
capacity conundrum, in which entities more in need of capacity-building funds are often less likely to receive them, 110 is an
issue for both state and LEA-focused competitive grant programs, 111 the problem is likely more acute when LEAs compete
for funds because the difference in capacity is generally more
drastic among LEAs than among states. 112
While LEAs pursuing UPK implementation would be
hindered by exclusion from a new federal grant program, they
would not be completely without recourse. The recentlyenacted Every Student Succeeds Act clarifies that LEAs can use
the funds they receive under Title I of ESEA for preschool, 113
109. Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273, 323 (2003); Deena Dulgerian,
Note, The Impact of the Every Student Succeeds Act on Rural Schools, 24 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 111, 127–28 (2016).
110. Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Education Federalism: President Obama’s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522, 533 (2011).
111. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
112. LORRAINE M. MCDONNELL & MILBREY W. MCLAUGHLIN, EDUCATION POLICY
AND THE ROLE OF THE STATES 153 (1982) (noting that even the lowest capacity state education agencies are capable of providing significant services to LEAs); James P. Spillane &
Charles L. Thompson, Reconstructing Conceptions of Local Capacity, 19 EDUCATIONAL
EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS 185 (1997) (describing the significant variability among
nine Michigan LEAs chosen for its study).
113. 20 U.S.C. § 7931 (2012); Christina A. Samuels, Law Adds to Pre-K’s Stature as
Federal-State Policy, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 5, 2016, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/
01/06/law-adds-to-pre-ks-stature-as-federal-state.html.
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and state plans are now required to describe how a state will assist LEAs that choose to use their funds for ECE programs. 114
Though it is unclear how these provisions will function in practice, they should, at the very least, provide some measure of accountability for a state’s efforts to assist LEA-UPK efforts.
Granting funds to states, ultimately, makes sense as a
matter of scale. Considering the nearly insurmountable obstacles that would impede federal implementation of nation-wide
UPK, 115 states are the highest level government entity that can
implement a UPK system. The federal government can therefore expand access to preschool most efficiently by working
with states. With over 13,000 LEAs in the U.S. and only 50
states, single instances of successful UPK implementation on a
statewide level would result in district-wide UPK for, on average, over 260 LEAs.
IV.THE STATE-LEVEL PROCESS OF CREATING UPK
When designing a competitive grant program that provides funds to states pursuing UPK reform, policymakers
should identify those circumstances that are most conducive to
successful state-level implementation of UPK. In identifying
these conditions, much can be learned by examining the history
of UPK’s enactment in the first three states to implement it,
Georgia, Oklahoma, and Florida.

a. Success Story – Georgia
In 1995, Georgia became the first state to offer publiclyfunded preschool for all four-year-olds. 116 Georgia should be
114. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g)(1)(A) (2012).
115. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
116. W. STEVEN BARNETT ET. AL, NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RES., THE STATE
OF PRESCHOOL: 2015 69 (2016); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 591-2-1-.01(1) (West 2017).
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looked to as an exemplar because its UPK program has proven
to be stable and of high quality. Georgia UPK has endured
through more than two decades and partisan shifts in both the
Governor’s office and the General Assembly. 117 The program
is, by all accounts, here to stay, garnering wide support from
the public and both political parties in the state. 118 Georgia
UPK has many of the characteristics that distinguish an early
childhood education program as high quality, 119 including its
comprehensive learning standards, 120 rigorous teacher requirements, 121 and small class sizes. 122 Funding for Georgia’s UPK
has, for the most part, steadily risen. 123 Most importantly,
Georgia’s UPK has produced good educational outcomes for its
young citizens. Research shows that Georgia UPK resulted in
significantly better school readiness across a wide variety of
skills. 124 These gains were evident among the subset of lowincome children, as well as the overall study population. 125
Georgia UPK can be traced back to a campaign promise
made in 1989 by Zell Miller, who was then a Democratic candidate for governor. Miller campaigned on a plan to legalize
lottery games within the state and earmark all proceeds for edu117. Fawn Johnson, How Georgia Got Republicans and Democrats to Embrace Universal Pre-K, THE ATLANTIC, (May 7, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/

05/how-georgia-got-republicans-and-democrats-to-embrace-universal-pre-k/430899/.
118. Id.; see also ELIZABETH ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START
TO UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 109 (2010) (citing as an example of state pride an Atlanta
Journal-Constitution article that states: “For generations, the South followed the lead of Massachusetts and other states in innovative, forward-looking programs. With Pre-K, we’re on
top.”).
119. BARNETT ET. AL, supra note 116, at 70.
120. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 591-1-1.03.
121. Id. § 591-1-1-.31.
122. Id. § 591-1-1-.32.
123. Governor’s Budget Report Documents, GOVERNOR’S OFF. OF PLAN. AND
BUDGET, http://opb.georgia.gov/governors-budget-report-documents (last visited Mar. 31,
2017).
124. ELLEN S. PEISNER-FEINBERG ET AL., FPG CHILD DEV. INST., THE UNIV. OF
N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, EFFECTS OF GA.’S PRE-K PROGRAM ON CHILDREN’S SCH.
READINESS SKILLS 12 (2014).
125. Id.
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cation programs. 126 Miller would later elaborate on these plans
by detailing two education programs to be funded by lottery
taxes: a scholarship fund for accomplished Georgia high school
graduates and a preschool program for low-income children. 127
Though the establishment of a lottery was opposed by politicians and influential religious organizations, the proposal had
wide support among the voting public. 128 Miller made the “Lottery for Education” the central platform of his campaign, and it
propelled him to easy victories in both the Democratic primary
and the general election. 129
After assuming office in the beginning of 1991, Governor Miller needed to execute some nimble political maneuvering to realize his campaign vision. Establishing the Lottery for
Education would require both a legislative act and an amendment to the state constitution, which prohibited lottery games
at the time. 130 The constitutional amendment required a referendum vote, in addition to a two-thirds majority in the state
legislature. 131 Once again, a coalition of influential entities
formed to oppose the lottery. 132 In response, Miller formed a
pro-amendment coalition, which was supported by powerful
business interests. 133 The narrow margin by which the amendment passed 134 evinces the success the anti-lottery coalition had
in undermining what had previously been wide support, and the
necessity of forming a pro-lottery coalition.

126. ANTHONY RADEN, FOUND. FOR CHILD DEV., UNIVERSAL PREKINDERGARTEN IN
GEORGIA – A CASE STUDY OF GEORGIA’S LOTTERY-FUNDED PRE-K PROGRAM 58 (1999);
ROSE, supra note 9, at 105.
127. RADEN, supra note 126, at 12.
128. Id. at 9.
129. Id. at 11-12; BRENDA K. BUSHOUSE, UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL: POLICY CHANGE,
STABILITY, AND THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 24-25 (2009).
130. RADEN, supra note 126, at 12.
131. Id.; GA. CONST. art. X, § 1, ¶ II.
132. RADEN, supra note 126, at 12.
133. Id. at 12-13.
134. Id. at 13.
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Additional political maneuvering was required even after
approval of the constitutional amendment. Miller needed to coax into agreement legislators who proposed using the lottery
funds for different types of educational expenditures, rather
than a new preschool program. 135 Relying on his mandate from
the voters, Miller eventually succeeded in enacting a bill that
funded the programs he had promised, among them public preschool for low-income children. 136 In June of 1993, almost two
and a half years after Miller assumed office, the Lottery for Education finally opened. 137
In 1994, with the Lottery for Education generating vastly more revenue than expected, Miller decided to expand Georgia’s pre-k program to provide universal access. 138 Hearing
rumblings from constituents not eligible under Georgia’s initial
targeted pre-k regime, Miller believed that such a move was
necessary to ensure the program’s survival. 139 In its first years,
Georgia’s pre-k was, in fact, assailed by Republican legislators,
who were ultimately unable to garner the political capital needed to pass amending legislation, 140 as was necessary to change
pre-k’s statutorily-embedded funding mechanism. 141 Only after
Miller’s Executive Secretary for Health and Education staged
an extensive public relations campaign to recapture support
from a newly-expanded cohort of eligible constituents did recurring attempts to scale back pre-k cease. 142

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.

RADEN, supra note 126, at 25.
Id; ELIZABETH ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO
UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 108 (2010).
140. RADEN, supra note 126, at 32.
141. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, ¶ VIII(c)(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1A-1 (2016); id. §
20-1A-4.
142. RADEN, supra note 126, at 32, 33; ROSE, supra note 139, at 108; BUSHOUSE, supra
note 11, at 64-65.
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In its incipiency, Georgia’s pre-k program also faced existential threats from other entities. Before its expansion to universal access, Georgia pre-k had to resolve political tensions
with Head Start providers in the state who felt the new program would marginalize Head Start and its historical role as
part of the Civil Rights movement. 143 Only after Miller’s team
remedied the absence of Head Start as a stakeholder in the prek coalition, and all parties realized that “there were plenty of atrisk four-year-olds and three-year-olds to go around,” did this
tension dissipate. 144
Miller’s team also believed the powerful child care industry lobby could have thwarted expansion to universal access
if it felt UPK would threaten the viability of private ECE providers. 145 Involving these private providers in a public-private
partnership, making them eligible for pre-k grants, turned potentially powerful opponents into partners. 146 This move also
alleviated some vexing logistical problems for UPK by vastly
expanding the state’s access to preexisting facilities. 147

b. Success Story – Oklahoma
Like UPK in Georgia, Oklahoma’s program should be
looked to as a model for establishing sustainable and impactful
UPK. Oklahoma UPK, created in 1998, has endured almost as
long as Georgia’s program. Though the partisan make-up of
the state legislature has shifted significantly, from a sizeable
Democratic majority at the time of the bill’s passage to what is
currently an overwhelming Republican majority, 148 UPK re143. RADEN, supra note 126, at 20.
144. Id. at 21.
145. Id. at 22-23; ROSE, supra note 139, at 107.
146. RADEN, supra note 126, at 23; ROSE, supra note 139, at 107.
147. RADEN, supra note 126, at 22; ROSE, supra note 139, at 107.
148. See
State
Senate
Since
Statehood,
OKLA.
ST.
LEGISLATURE,
http://www.oksenate.gov/senators/ historic_members/state_senate_historical.PDF (last visited
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mains on solid ground. Preschool in Oklahoma is not a partisan
issue over which legislators tussle. 149 Rather, it is a point of
pride that transcends state politics. 150
Oklahoma UPK serves 75% of the state’s four-yearolds, trailing only Vermont and Florida among U.S. states. 151
Oklahoma UPK has many of the earmarks of a quality program. 152 Notably, Oklahoma seeks to ensure an adequate supply
of qualified preschool teachers, who must hold a bachelor’s degree and complete an early childhood certification, 153 by codifying strict salary-schedule parity with K-3 teachers. 154 Funding
for pre-k is calculated algorithmically, with a portion of the
overall education budget being allotted based on the number of
preschool-aged children in each district. 155 Consequently, UPK
cannot be separated from other items in the education budget
and disproportionately reduced through the appropriations
process. A study of the state’s largest school district found that
participating four year-olds, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, were months ahead, in terms of school
readiness, than those who did not participate. 156 Gains were evident not only in reading, writing, and math, but also in
measures of attentiveness and other socio-emotional factors. 157
Mar. 31, 2017); House of Representatives: Historic Members, OKLA. ST. LEGISLATURE,
http://www.okhouse.gov/Members/Historic.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
149. Lillian Mongeau, Why Oklahoma’s public preschools are some of the best in the
country, THE HECHINGER REP., (February 2, 2016), https://hechingerreport.org/whyoklahomas-public-preschools-are-some-of-the-best-in-the-country/; Nicholas Kristof, Oklahoma! Where the Kids Learn Early, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/11/10/opinion/sunday/kristof-oklahoma-where-the-kids-learn-early.html.
150. MONGEAU, supra note 149.
151. W. STEVEN BARNETT ET. AL, NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RES., THE STATE
OF PRESCHOOL: 2015 133 (2016); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 591-2-1-.01(1) (West 2017).
152. Id. at 134.
153. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 11-103.7(B) (West 2017).
154. Id. § 18-114.14.
155. Id. §§ 18-200.1(A), 18-201.1(B)(1).
156. WILLIAM T. GORMELY JR., GEORGETOWN PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW,
OKLAHOMA’S UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL PROGRAM: BETTER THAN OK (2013).
157. Id.

46

MCWALTERS_MACROS.DOCM (DO NOT DELETE)

1]

4/10/2019 12:12 PM

The Federal Role in Universal Pre-K

To the extent that Oklahoma’s UPK was created
through “political sleight of hand,” 158 its use as a model for
state-level processes is limited. Representative Joe Eddins’ ability to shepherd his UPK bill through a less-than-heedful legislature and secure the votes of lawmakers unaware of the bill’s
impact is not something that can or should be readily replicated
in other states. 159 However, the creation of Oklahoma’s UPK is
also attributable to more exemplary conditions, such as institutional knowledge, expansive networks, and well-managed publicity.
Eddins’ early attempts to get education bills passed ended in frustrating failure. 160 As an inexperienced lawmaker, Eddins believed the viability of a bill would depend on its sponsor’s ability to articulate its efficacy during floor debates. 161
Instead, he found that legislators needed to garner support
through casual advocacy prior to a bill’s introduction. 162 The
political know-how that Eddins acquired as a result of these experiences proved crucial to his ability to get his UPK bill enacted. 163
Eddins also knew how to court allies and soften potential opposition. When drafting his UPK bill, Eddins worked
with a representative of the Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, who
believed that UPK was a means to address workforce development concerns. 164 Eddins also cultivated relationships with
Head Start and private daycare providers, which helped to en-

158. CHRISTIAN M. BELL, THE CURIOUS CASE OF OKLAHOMA: A HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE PASSAGE OF UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN LEGISLATION IN
OKLAHOMA 60 (May 2013), https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/ handle/2152/20937.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 55; BRENDA K. BUSHOUSE, UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL: POLICY CHANGE,
STABILITY, AND THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 41 (2009).
161. Bell, supra note 158, at 60-61.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 60; BUSHOUSE, supra note 160, at 41.
164. Bell, supra note 158, at 56-58; BUSHOUSE, supra note 160, at 40-41.
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sure that his bill provoked minimal external opposition. 165 Lastly, Eddins tailored his pitch for Oklahoma’s Republican governor, who signed the bill into law with little fanfare. 166
Whereas Miller utilized a public relations campaign to
ensure continued support for Georgia’s UPK, Eddins, also
cognizant of a new UPK program’s fragility, consciously avoided publicity. 167 At a time when Oklahoma’s education budget
was growing, the dilution of preexisting education funds did not
draw much negative attention. 168 Oklahoma’s UPK managed to
stay under the radar as a political issue while attendance in the
program steadily grew. 169 The program finally came to the forefront of the public’s consciousness in 2004, when a major study
ranked Oklahoma as the best state in the country in terms of
access to state-funded preschool. 170 The sense of pride generated by this recognition solidified the political viability of Oklahoma’s UPK program. 171

c. A Cautionary Tale – Florida
In 2005, Florida became the third state to implement
UPK. Florida UPK, known as the Voluntary Prekindergarten
Education Program (VPK), currently serves 76% of the state’s
four year-olds, second only to Vermont among U.S. states. 172

165. Bell, supra note 158, at 61-62; BUSHOUSE, supra note160, at 43, 45.
166. Bell, supra note 158, at 65; BUSHOUSE, supra note 160, at 47; see also ELIZABETH
ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO UNIVERSAL PREKINDERGARTEN 112 (2010) (chronicling the governors vetoing of preceding education bills).
167. Bell, supra note 158, at 65-66; ROSE, supra note 166, at 114.
168. WILLIAM T. GORMELY JR. & DEBORAH PHILLIPS, THE EFFECTS OF UNIVERSAL
PRE-K IN OKLAHOMA: RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 5 (2003); ROSE,
supra note 166, at 114.
169. Bell, supra note 158, at 67.
170. Id.
171. Id.; Lillian Mongeau, Why Oklahoma’s public preschools are some of the best in the
country, THE HECHINGER REP., (February 2, 2016), https://hechingerreport.org/whyoklahomas-public-preschools-are-some-of-the-best-in-the-country/.
172. W. STEVEN BARNETT ET. AL, NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RES., THE STATE
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However, Florida’s VPK differs in some important respects
from UPK in Georgia and Oklahoma, and these differences
militate against using Florida as a model for UPK implementation. Unlike Georgia (with its lottery funding) or Oklahoma
(with its statutory algorithm), preschool funding in Florida is
determined solely through the annual legislative appropriations
process. 173 This likely explains, in part, why preschool funding
remains a contentious issue. 174 Despite an all-time high budget
in 2016, Florida’s preschool spending remained flat, 175 and perchild spending has steadily dropped since the program’s third
year. 176 The total spending per preschool-enrolled child in
Florida is $2,304, about 60% of what Georgia and Oklahoma
spend per child. 177
Given its relatively low level of funding, it is unsurprising that Florida’s VPK is lacking in many of the quality indicators present in Georgia and Oklahoma. 178 Most notably, teachers in the year-long VPK program are not required to hold a
bachelor’s degree, but rather only a child development associate
credential. 179 Florida law also only provides for three-hour
days, 180 compared with six or more hours provided by the UPK
programs in Georgia and Oklahoma. 181 Public perception of

OF PRESCHOOL: 2015

9, 67 (2016).
173. Id. at 67.
174. See Scott Maxwell, Florida’s Pre-K Cuts Hurt Kids, Ignore Voters’ Mandate,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 4, 2016, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-florida-prek-scott-maxwell-20160504-column.html.
175. Leslie Postal, Flat Funding Frustrates Preschool Advocates, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
April 4, 2016, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/features/education/os-pre-k-florida-budgetspending-flat-20160404-story.html.
176. DAPHNA BASSOK ET AL., UNIV. OF VA., EDPOLICYWORKS, FLORIDA’S
VOLUNTARY PRE-KINDERGARTEN PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LARGEST STATE PRESCHOOL PROGRAM IN THE NATION 8 (2014).
177. BARNETT ET. AL, supra note 172, at 68, 70, 134. Georgia and Oklahoma spend
$3,880 and $3,709, respectively, per child.
178. Id. at 68.
179. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1002.55(3)(c), 1002.63(4) (West 2017).
180. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6M-8.204(3) (2017),
181. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 591-2-1-.01(1) (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §
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Florida VPK’s mediocrity is widespread, though not unanimous. 182 However, flawed data-collection mechanisms have
limited researchers’ ability to study the impact VPK has on participating children, 183 leaving quantifiable inputs as the best
available heuristic for assessing the efficacy of VPK.
The impetus for Florida’s VPK was provided not by a
politician but rather by the state’s citizens, who passed, with
almost 60% of the vote, 184 a 2002 ballot referendum that mandated the state legislature to provide for universal preschool by
2005. 185 This mandate specified that this program be “established according to high quality standards.” 186 What was not
specified was how this program would be funded, though the
referendum did proscribe diverting existing educational
funds. 187
The ballot initiative was not without politically-savvy
advocates; then-Executive Mayor of Miami-Dade County Alex
Penelas, as well as former Miami Herald Publisher David Lawrence Jr., played a substantial role in enshrining the UPK mandate in the state’s constitution. 188 However, after the ballot initiative passed, both champions found themselves on the outside
of the ensuing legislative process. The Florida legislature,
which had previously balked at legislation that would have cre-

11-103.7(B) (West 2017).
182. Denise S. Amos, Study: Florida’s Preschool Funding, Quality are Below National
Standards, FLA. TIMES-UNION, May 11, 2015, http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2015-0511/story/study-floridas-preschool-funding-quality-are-below-national-standards#.
183. Chester E. Finn Jr., Voluntary Pre-Kindergarten, in REFORMING EDUCATION IN
FLORIDA 229, 237-38 (Paul E. Peterson ed. 2006).
184. JIM HAMPTON, FOUNDATION FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT, HOW FLORIDA’S
VOTERS ENACTED UPK WHEN THEIR LEGISLATURE WOULDN’T 10 (2004).
185. Id. at 8.
186. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(b)
187. Id. § 1(c); Linda A. White et al., Policy Logics, Framing Strategies, and Policy
Change: Lessons from Universal Pre-K Policy Debates in California and Florida, 48 POLICY
SCI. 395, 408 (2015).
188. HAMPTON, supra note 184, at 3; ROSE, supra note 9, at 163.
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ated UPK, 189 was slow to act on this mandate. Mired in a budget crisis, the legislature spent little effort contouring a UPK
program in 2003. 190 The legislature did commission a Universal
Prekindergarten Education Advisory Council to research policy
options and make recommendations. 191
However, in 2004 the legislature, not yet out from under the budget crisis, 192 was more concerned with frugally getting out from under the UPK mandate than incorporating recommendations meant to ensure quality. The first bare-bones
UPK bill to pass the legislature generated public criticism for
its minimal standards, and was vetoed by the governor in July of
2004. 193 In December, in a special legislative session, lawmakers
passed another UPK bill that, while less austere than the previous iteration, was still criticized by Democrats and education
advocates for ignoring many of the council’s recommendations. 194 However, with the referendum-imposed deadline for
implementing UPK fast approaching, the governor signed this
bill into law. 195
V. DESIGNING A FEDERAL GRANT PROGRAM TO
CULTIVATE UPK
While previous federal ECE programs have often waded
into the complicated and contentious business of promulgating
specific quality standards, 196 the preceding part demonstrates
189. HAMPTON, supra note 184, at 5.
190. Id. at 14.
191. White et al., supra note 187, at 409.
192. BARBARA A. ORMOND, THE URBAN INST., STATE RESPONSES TO BUDGET CRISES
IN 2004: FLORIDA (2004).
193. White et al., supra note 187, at 409; ROSE, supra note 9, at 163.
194. White et al., supra note 187, at 409; ROSE, supra note 9, at 163.
195. White et al., supra note 187, at 409.
196. For instance, while few would question that teacher experience is important to
quality, there is a vigorous debate about whether some certification requirements in some jurisdictions are too high and actually create a dearth of eligible teachers, hurting the quality of a
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that states are quite capable of making optimal design choices
when certain conditions are present. The history of UPK’s creation in Georgia, Oklahoma, and Florida, and the subsequent
trajectory of their respective programs illuminate three circumstances that are crucial to successful implementation of highquality UPK: a diverse group of stakeholders advocating for
UPK, strong grassroots support for UPK, and the availability
of a funding mechanism that is not vulnerable to expedient reductions. Any competitive federal grant program should be
cognizant of these factors and incorporate them into the application process.

a. Involving Stakeholders from a Broad Range of Backgrounds
The stories of UPK’s inception in Georgia, Oklahoma,
and Florida demonstrate the importance of collaboration
among a range of stakeholders. While the state education agencies (SEAs) that complete applications for education grant programs can be presumed to possess expertise on matters of education policy, history suggests that successful implementation
of UPK requires additional sorts of expertise usually outside of
an SEA’s institutional competence. The champions of UPK in
Georgia and Oklahoma were both deft politicians first and education advocates second, while in Florida the absence of any
such figure, at least after the ballot initiative passed, is conspicuous. Collaboration with individuals or entities possessing expertise in the state’s political processes is crucial to putting education policy theory into practice. A federal UPK grant

preschool system as a whole. Michael Alison Chandler, D.C. Among First in Nation to Require
Workers to Get College Degrees, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/district-among-the-first-in-nation-torequire-child-care-workers-to-get-college-degrees/2017/03/30/d7d59e18-0fe9-11e7-9d5aa83e627dc120_story.html.

Child-Care
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program should compel SEAs to work with such parties and
reward those SEAs that do so.
SEAs involving Head Start administrators, private preschool providers, and other groups that would be affected the
implementation of UPK should likewise be encouraged. Cooperating with these parties in Georgia, Oklahoma, and Florida
preempted some potentially powerful opposition and ensured
fewer obstacles on the path to UPK implementation.
Previous educational grant programs have heeded stakeholder involvement. Applicants for the Preschool Development
Grants (PDG) were asked to demonstrate that their plans for
preschool expansion were “supported by a broad group of
stakeholders” 197 and to point to “enacted and pending legislation, policies, or practices that demonstrate the State’s current
and future commitment.” 198 However, support of stakeholders
was just one of multiple items to be addressed in the applicant’s
Executive Summary, which in total was only worth up to 10 of
a possible 230 points. 199 Highlighting legislation and policies
that evince a commitment to early childhood education was
worth only four points. 200
These criteria should be given more weight. PDG’s focus on ensuring quality, which constitute the bulk of available
points, 201 is commendable. However, articulating a plan for ensuring quality or expanding access is of little use without institutional know-how to get the plan put into action. Furthermore, a broad coalition that includes early childhood education
advocates and experts is likely to produce high-quality stand-

197. Applications for New Awards; Preschool Development Grants – Development
Grants, 79 Fed. Reg. 48854, 48863 (Aug. 18, 2014).
198. Id. at 48864.
199. Id. at 48868.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 48868-69.
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ards even without the specter of federal appraisal, as Georgia
and Oklahoma’s history demonstrates.
The next federal grant program should also require
states to do more than merely summarize the support it purports to have. Bare assertions that a state’s stakeholders include
“representatives from across the state and from various political
parties, as well as various state agencies,” as was claimed by one
state that was awarded funds, 202 do not provide a basis for distinguishing states on the basis of this factor, nor does it compel
further collaboration. PDG’s predecessor, the Race to the Top
– Early Learning Challenge, asked states to obtain letters of intent or support from early childhood educators, state legislators, school boards, representatives of private and faith-based
early learning programs, and many others. 203 Such a criterion is
more useful for evaluating and cultivating stakeholder collaboration. It is unclear why the Department of Education did not
likewise seek letters of support for PDG. 204
However, the Department of Education recently created
a paradigm of stakeholder involvement that is even more promising. In 2016, the Department promulgated new regulations
for the state plans required under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which provides substantial block grant funds
to states for K-12 education. 205 The regulations ensure “timely
and meaningful consultation with stakeholders” by requiring
states to solicit and incorporate input from the governor, state
legislators, community-based and civil rights organizations, and

202. ARIZ. DEP’T OF EDUC., ARIZONA APPLICATION FOR FUNDING UNDER
PRESCHOOL DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – DEVELOPMENT GRANTS 8 (2014).
203. Applications for New Awards; Race to the Top – Early Learning Challenge, 76 Fed.
Reg. 53564, 53574 (Aug. 26, 2011).
204. Notice and comment rulemaking was waived for the promulgation of the PDG application, 79 Fed. Reg. 48854, 48854 (Aug. 18, 2014), and comments otherwise solicited are no
longer available on ED’s website, https://www2.ed.gov/programs/preschooldevelopmentgrants/
resources.html.
205. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2012).
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others. 206 These regulations, along with many other, were recently nullified by an exercise of the Congressional Review
Act, 207 making such consultation optional for states. It is unclear
whether this action is at all indicative of partisan hostility towards such requirements or merely part of zealous effort to peel
back much of the previous administration’s accomplishments.
The consultation regulations specifically garnered “extensive
support” during the notice and comment period, 208 and state
plans drafted before their repeal demonstrate how such regulations can successfully beget the meaningful consultation
sought, 209 offering hope that similar requirements will remain
politically viable in the future. Policymakers designing a federal
UPK grant program would be wise to replicate this model by
awarding substantial points to SEAs that conduct and document consultations with the statesmen, providers, and ECE advocates whose involvement has proven to be essential to successful UPK implementation.

b. Assessing Grassroots Support
A swell of grassroots support in Georgia and Florida
were essential to the creation of UPK. Zell Miller’s Lottery for
Education platform was belittled by opponents and the press,
but unyielding support from the general public provided Miller
the mandate he needed to push the program through. In Florida, citizens exercised their power of direct democracy to codify
a right to UPK after the legislature failed to do so. The resiliency of high-quality UPK in Georgia and Oklahoma is also at206. 34 C.F.R. §§ 299.13(b), 299.15(a) (2016).
207. Pub. L. No 115-13, 131 Stat. 77 (2017).
208. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as Amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act – Accountability and State Plans, 81 Fed. Reg. 86076, 86190 (Nov. 29,
2016).
209. See, e.g., OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., OHIO DRAFT SUBMISSION FOR PUBLIC
COMMENT 16-21 (2017).
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tributable in no small part to the pride cultivated among the
public after UPK’s implementation.
No previous ECE federal grant program has considered
public support or grassroots advocacy as a criterion. However,
for any future program that contemplates a federal role limited
to assisting states create their own UPK program, this factor is
critical.
One option for cognizing this factor is requiring states
to articulate how they plan to bolster public support for UPK.
Such an approach appears to be without precedent among federal grant programs, and it is not difficult to imagine why.
Providing federal funds to an SEA to coordinate grassroots
lobbying activities meant to influence the state legislature provokes strong federalism concerns and may run afoul federal
spending restrictions. 210 Federal funds have been used to free up
state resources then used to fund political activity, 211 but for any
federal funds that carry with them explicit instructions on how
to use state funds, that distinction is illusory. Aside from pushing the legal limits of the federal government’s spending power,
such an approach may provoke counterproductive political
backlash. Notions of federal meddling in state affairs has proven to be an effective arrow in the quiver of opponents seeking
to undermine public support for a government spending program. 212
This conundrum illustrates the inherent limits of the
federal government’s power to shape a state’s political priorities
and provides support to this paper’s contention that UPK is

210. Federal regulations generally prohibit federal grantees from using funds for lobbying activities. 2 C.F.R. § 200.450(c) (2016). To what extent grassroots advocacy constitutes lobbying activities and how far removed a grantee must be from said activities is unclear.
211. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-Optation, 92 YALE L.J.
1344, 1344 (1983).
212. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Crafting a Narrative for the Red State Option, 102 KY.
L.J. 381, 408 (2014).
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best pursued by adhering to the competitive grant model. 213
While Obama envisioned a program which would result in all
50 states implementing statewide UPK, this goal is at odds with
his professed affinity for cooperative federalism. Cooperative
federalism implies that the federal government will assist states
pursuing some shared goal at the state’s own prerogative, and it
is unlikely that all 50 states would prioritize UPK.
To this end, a UPK grant program should require states
to assess how much public support UPK currently has in the
state. Requiring states to point to polls and gauge public support through discussions with advocacy organizations would allow the federal government to direct its funds to those states
that are most conducive to producing the desired result of
UPK-implementation. These requirements would also have the
collateral effect of making SEAs more cognizant of the opportunities or hurdles that public sentiment presents and opening
up lines of communication between SEAs and advocacy groups
within the state. Requiring state assessment, then, could also
encourage states to engage in grassroots advocacy, but in a
manner less vulnerable to federalism attacks. 214

c. Exploring Embedded Funding Mechanisms
In Georgia and Oklahoma, funding mechanisms embedded directly into state law and not subject to the appropriations
process have assured that UPK continues to receive the funding
necessary to provide a high-quality ECE. Though these embedded mechanisms are subject to their own fluctuations, 215
213. See supra Section III.a.
214. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
215. See Fawn Johnson, How Georgia Got Republicans and Democrats to Embrace
Universal Pre-K, THE ATLANTIC, (May 7, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics
/archive/2014/05/how-georgia-got-republicans-and-democrats-to-embrace-universal-prek/430899/ (describing the state lottery’s economic downturn in 2014 and the subsequent effect
on the UPK program); GENE PERRY, OK. POLICY INST., OKLAHOMA CONTINUES TO LEAD
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they have insulated UPK from the more volatile political currents. Though cutting funding to a new expenditure through
the appropriations process is normally an expedient means of
reeling in spending, legislators in Georgia and Oklahoma
would need to go through the much more onerous process of
statutory or even constitutional amendment. In contrast, funding for Florida’s VPK, which was relatively low to begin with,
has been chipped away for years through the appropriations
process.
A federal UPK grant program designed to boost state
capacity, rather create on-going cost-sharing arrangements, 216
should put more emphasis on a state’s ability to secure sustainable funding than previous programs have. The PDG rubric
only awarded a maximum of 10 points, out of a possible 230,
for “Budget and Sustainability” 217 and elsewhere up to 12 points
for describing how it would sustain high-quality preschool programs once the grant period ended. 218 The minimal weight given to these criteria does not correspond to their demonstrated
importance to successful UPK implementation, and SEAs completing these applications were required to do little more than
offer conclusory statements about the strong support highquality preschool enjoys in the legislature and governor’s office. 219
As with stakeholder involvement, sustainability is a criterion that should be afforded more weight, even at the expense
of possibly diminishing the relative importance of the criteria
regarding quality standards. As Florida’s experience shows, 220
U.S. FOR DEEPEST CUTS TO EDUCATION (2014).
216. See supra Section III.a.
217. Applications for New Awards; Preschool Development Grants – Development
Grants, 79 Fed. Reg. 48854, 48866 (Aug. 18, 2014).
218. Id. at 48865.
219. ALA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN’S AFFAIRS, ALABAMA PRESCHOOL DEVELOPMENT
GRANT PROJECT 42 (2014).
220. See supra Section IV.c.
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formulating quality standards can be much easier than funding
them.
In addition to affording sustainability more weight, a
federal UPK grant program should require a more thorough
analysis by prompting states to detail possible paths to the creation of embedded funding mechanisms and assess the political
feasibility within the state of these various options. 221 Georgia
and Oklahoma offer two paradigms for applicant states to explore. As Zell Miller demonstrated, earmarking revenues from
a wholly new source of funding can buffer a UPK program
from the usual attacks by fiscal conservatives. In recent years,
several states have been able to generate substantial revenue
through the legalization of marijuana, revenue that is then used
to create or bolster state spending programs, including some
education programs. 222 In states considering legalization, a federal grant program that prioritizes sustainability could encourage SEAs and their collaborating stakeholders to explore the viability pairing the potential revenues and a new UPK program.
While marijuana-funded preschools may induce cognitive dissonance, Georgia’s Lottery for Education shows how classical
liberalism and education advocacy can make strange and effective bedfellows.
Oklahoma provides another means of embedding funding. Applicant states should be encouraged to explore how the
state’s existing laws for education funding might be amended to
provide for an algorithmic calculation of pre-k funding, as Ok-

221. Alternatively, a grant program could craft a rubric that rewards points to states for
actually having passed such laws. Opting for this approach stands to make a more definitive impact but also imperils a programs political feasibility. See Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New
Model for States as Laboratories for Reform: How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1536-38 (2011).
222. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-28.8-501 (West 2017); see David Gutman, Is
Marijuana Money the Answer to Fund Washington Schools?, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 21, 2017,
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/state-weighs-using-pot-revenue-to-plugschool-funding-gap/.
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lahoma’s law now does. This approach may not be viable in a
number of states, and was indeed explicitly rejected by Florida
voters, because the notion of diverting existing funds away from
other education programs is unpalatable. However, for states
considering a substantial infusion of education funds or other
major reforms, changes to funding formulas could be on the table.
Applicants may conceive of still other ways to embed
funding. Some federal agencies have, for instance, been authorized by statute to generate their own funds by levying fees for
certain services or through enforcement actions. 223 A federal
UPK grant program should encourage states to think creatively
about all possible options for sustainability.
As with prompting states for an assessment of grassroots
support, requiring states to explore and document the possible
paths to embedded funding serves two important functions.
First, it will allow the federal government to funnel funds to
those states most able to independently maintain sufficient levels of funding after the federal capacity-building grant is expended. Second, it will make SEAs and collaborating stakeholders cognizant of the opportunities present in their state and
could mobilize their collective capabilities towards realizing
these opportunities.
VI.CONCLUSION
“That’s something we should be able to do,” President
Obama said of universal preschool in his 2013 speech to the nation. 224 The positive impact preschool can have on numerous
life outcomes illustrate why this is a laudable goal. Even with

223. Christopher DeMuth Sr. & Michael S. Greve, Agency Finance in the Age of Executive Government, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 555, 560-63, 567-68 (2017).
224. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013).
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finite resources, creating universal access to preschool should
be prioritized over targeted programs. UPK not only effectuates a number of national interests but may also secure equality
benefits more effectively than targeted programs.
However, Obama’s optimism about the feasibility of
achieving instantaneous nation-wide UPK has been shown to
be misplaced. His proposed state-federal cost sharing model
gained no traction during his administration and its prospects
of success during the current administration are virtually nil. A
federal competitive grant program, on the other hand, has
proven feasible and stands to make a profound impact in those
states that participate.
By emphasizing stakeholder participation, grassroots
support, and the availability of embedded funding mechanisms,
three conditions that have proven crucial to creating UPK on
the state-level, the federal government can identify those states
ripe for UPK implementation and provide capacity-bolstering
funds to help them achieve it. Facilitating successful UPK reform in a handful of states might even create a ripple effect,
spurring more and more states to implement UPK and eventually leading to a nation where preschool is indeed available to
all.
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